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Donley and Funt: Personal Transactions with Persons Deceased at the Time of TrialEDITORIAL NOTES
PERSONAL TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS DECEASED
AT THE TIME OF TRIAL-AN ANALYSIS OF
CASES AND A SUGGESTION FOR
STATUTORY CHANGE
In a recent West Virginia case a personal representative
instituted an action to recover for the wrongful death of his
decedent, growing out of an automobile wreck. The court held that
the defendant motorist and his wife were incompetent to testify
as to the actions and movements of the deceased, because such
actions and movements came within the statute barring "personal
transactions or communications" with a person deceased at the
time of trial.' The far-reaching possibilities of the decision are
best illustrated by an example given in the dissenting opinion by
Judge Maxwell: "To illustrate: A man, alone, is carefully and
lawfully driving his automobile on a highway when another automobile carrying a group of drunken rowdies collides with his.
One of them is killed and his personal representative sues the one
driver. The survivors of the hoodlum car may all testify; the
solitary driver may not. Where is the justice of such an absurd
result? Why place a law-abiding citizen at such extreme disadvantage? " 2 This case raises a query as to how near the place of
collision the approaching cars must come before the occupants of
each can be said to be engaging in a "personal transaction" Such
an interpetation of the statute is very likely to lead to harsh
results.
The statute3 and decisions construing it have long been
'Strode v. Dyer, 177 S. E. 878 (W. Va. 1935). Judge Hatcher joined in
the dissent.
2 There are a few cases in other jurisdictions which are in accord with
the majority opinion: Boyd v. Williams, 207 N. C. 30, 175 S. E. 832 (1934);
So. Natural Gas Co. v. Davidson, 225 Ala. 171, 142 So. 63 (1932); Miller v.
Walsh's Adm'x, 240 Ky. 822, 43 S. W. (2d) 42 (1931); Van Meter v.
Goldfarb, 317 Ill. 620, 148 N. E. 391 (1925); Hallowach v. Priest, 113 Me.
510, 95 Atl. 146 (1915) ; Hudson v. Houser, 123 Ind. 309, 24 N. E. 243 (1890).
. 3W. VA. REV. CODE (1931)
c. 57, art. 3, § 1. "No person offered as a
witness in any civil action, suit or proceeding, shall be excluded by reason of
his interest in the event of the action, suit or proceeding, or because as a
party thereto, except as follows: no party to any action, suit or proceeding,
nor any person interested in the event thereof, nor any person from, through
or under whom any such party or interested person derives any interest or
title by assignment or otherwise, shall be examined as a witness in regard to
any personal transaction or communication between such witness and a person at the time of such examination, deceased, insane or lunatic, against the
executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee or
survivor of such person, or the assignee or committee of such insane person
or lunatic. But this prohibition shall not extend to any transaction or communication as to which any such executor, administrator, heir at law, next
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criticized by the courts and the profession as unsatisfactory, uncertain of application and consequently unjust.4 An examination
of the cases will demonstrate some of these faults.
Perhaps the most common type of case is that involving a
contract for the furnishing of materials, or services in return for
a promised price or compensation. The promisor dies and the party
furnishing such services attempts by his own testimony to support
an action against the personal representative of the decedent. The
leading case in West Virginia is Owens v. Owens' Adm'r, an
action of assumpsit to recover for work done by plaintiff as housekeeper for the defendant's decedent, and for nursing, furnishing
of supplies, and out-door labor. The court held that plaintiff could
not testify in her own behalf that she performed such services.
Even at this early date the court admitted that it was impossible
to specify in advance what facts and circumstances would constitute a "personal transaction", and that "each case must to some
of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee, survivor or committee shall be examined
on his own behalf, nor as to which the testimony of such deceased person or
lunatic shall be given in evidence: provided, however, that where an action
is brought for causing the death of any person by a wrongful act, neglect
or default under Article 7, Chapter 55 of this Code, the physician sued shall
have the right to give evidence in any case in which he is sued; but in this
event he can only give evidence as to the medicine or treatment given to the
deceased, or to operation performed, but he cannot give evidence of any conversation had with the deceased.
"In any suit or proceeding in which a county is interested, no person shall
be incompetent as a witness by reason of his being an inhabitant of the
county or liable to county levies, or a member of the County Court."
41 WiGmonE ox Evi NNcs (1923) 707, § 578. "Can it be more important
to save dead men's estates from false claims than to save living men's
estates from loss by lack of proofI"
"(1) That the supposed danger of interested persons testifying falsely
exists to a limited extent only; (2) That, even so, yet, so far as they testify
truly, the exclusion is an intolerable injustice; (3) That no exclusion can be
so- defined as to be rational, consistent, and workable; (4) That in any case
the test of cross-examination and the other safeguards for truth are a sufficient guaranty against frequent false decision. Every one of the first three
objections applies to the present rule as amply as to the old and broader rule.
The fourth applies with less apparent force, because the opponent's testimony
is lacking in contradiction. And yet, upon what inconsistencies is based even
this support for the rule! For its defenders in effect declare the lack of this
opposing testimony to be the sole ground for an exceptional rule adapted to
that particular situation; and yet, since the deceased opponent is a party, he
would have been by hypothesis a potential liar equally with the disqualified
survivor; so that the rule rests on the supposed lack of a questionable species
of testimony equally weak with that which is excluded. There never was and
never will be an exclusion on the score of interest which can be defended as
either logically or practically sound. Add to this, the labyrinthine distinctions
created in the applications of the complicated statutes defining this rule;
and the result is a mass of vain quiddities which have not the slightest relation
to the testimonial trustworthiness of the witness."
*14 W. Va. 88 (1878).
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extent be decided, as it shall arise." The rigor of this decision was
apparently relaxed in Pouse u. (Jilf-ilan,6 in which the promisee
was permitted to testify as to his furnishing of labor on and material for a building in performance of a contract to which the
deceased person was a party. The court expressly refused to follow Owens v. Owens'" to the full extent of its implications, and
held that the testimony of the plaintiff "could in no possible way
tend to prove what the transaction was" between the parties. This
case was approved in Poling v. Huffman s in which the contract
was in writing. An effort was made to distinguish the Owens case
upon the ground that there the contract was not in writing, but
was to be implied in fact from the circumstances. Therefore, the
testimony as to furnishing the materials and services proved not
only the performance of the contract, but the very fornuaion and
existence of the contract itself. It is submitted that there is no
foundation for this distinction in the policy of the statute. The
temptation to perjury would seem to be equally great when the
party is testifying to performance as when testifying to the formation of the contract-and equally incapable of contradiction.
In other cases of similar character the court has permitted
theoretically "disinterested" witnesses, not parties to the action,
to testify concerning the rendition of services to the decedent. For
example, an emancipated infant's father was permitted to testify
in her behalf.9 In another case a plaintiff's wife was excluded from
testifying in an action to recover for one-half of the sums expended
in the care and maintenance of a horse and buggy owned jointly
by the plaintiff and the decedent. There being no written contract,
the court relied on the Owens case. However, a daughter of the
plaintiff was permitted to testify as to the facts, and another witness as to the reasonable value of services. The testimony of these
witnesses was held sufficient to justify submission of the case to
the jury, which could have found a verdict upon a general claim
against the estate of the decedent, without reference to the particular items listed in the plaintiff's statement of account.2 0 A
plaintiff's son was permitted to testify as to conversations had
with the deceased person 1 Again, a lessor cannot testify as to a
verbal agreement with his deceased tenant fixing the amount of the
o 45 W. Va. 213, 32 S. E. 178 (1898).
7Supra n.5.
a 48 W. Va. 639, 37 S. ". 526 (1900).
9

"Weese v. Yokam, 62 W. Va. 550, 59 S. E.514 (1907).

10 Barrett v. Andrew, 81 W. Va. 283, 94 S. E. 144 (1917).

ai Hollen v. Crim and Peck, 62 W. Va. 451, 59 S. E.7 (1907).
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rent, in an action against the tenant's administratrix. 2 Upon the
other hand, in an action by the assignee of a note against the
administrator of the assignor, alleging a redelivery of the instrument to the assignor for collection, to recover the proceeds of such
collection, the maker of the note was held competent to testify on
behalf of the plaintiff that the instrument was so assigned and
that he (the maker) had paid it"
Another common type of case involves an issue as to the
mental capacity of a deceased person. Thus, it is said that one who
would inherit an interest in the land if the deed of the deceased
grantor should be set aside, is incompetent to testify originally as
to the mental capacity of the grantor. However, if the grantee
testifies as to such capacity, the interested heir may testify in
rebuttal. The court stated broadly that "if one of the parties testifies in regard to such communications or transactions under the
exception contained in [the statute] the other interested party is
authorized to give his version."' 4 Similarly, the husbands of contestants of a will were held incompetent to testify as to the mental
capacity of the decedent to make a will The court said that the
words "personal transaction" include personal contact with and
observations of the deceased's conduct, upon which an opinion as
to his mental condition was formed. 1 Expressions to the same
effect are found in a case in which suit was instituted by the administrator to set aside a deed executed by the decedent, upon the
ground of lack of mental capacity. The court permitted the
scrivener of the deed and the attesting notary public (not parties
to the suit) to testify as to such mental capacity. In fact, their
testimony is said to be entitled to peculiar weight.18 It is submitted
that this again demonstrates the fallacy in the reasoning which
purports to be the foundation of the statute: the temptation to
falsify. Clearly, the scrivener and the notary would not relish
admitting that they participated in the execution of a deed by a
person whom they believed to be mentally incompetent. Their
professional reputations would certainly suffer by such an admis12 Martufi v. Daniels, 99 W. Va. 673, 129 S. E. 709 (1925). See also Hurst's
Adm'r v. Hite's Adm'r, 20 W. Va. 183 (1882).
13 Sayre v. Woodyard, Adm'r, 66 W. Va. 288, 66 S. B. 320 (1909); of.
Bollen v. Crim and Peek, supra n.11.
14 Curtis v. Curtis, 85 W. Va. 37, 41, 100 S. E. 856 (1919).
1 Freeman v. Freeman, 71 W. Va. 303, 309, 76 S. B. 657, 659 (1912);
Anything to the contrary in Hudkcins v. Crim, 64 W. Va. 225, 61 S. E. 166
(1908), was overruled.
1a Dook, Adm'r v. Smith, 93 W. Va. 133, 116 S. E. 691 (1923).
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sion, and therefore the motive for false swearing would seem to
be equally present.
In an action on behalf of an insane plaintiff, by her next
friend, against the heirs of plaintiff's deceased committee, the
plaintiff sought to prove that she had rendered services to her
committee which had not been credited by him in making his
final settlement. The defendants were not permitted to testify that
the plaintiff was too weak, mentally and physically, to render
services of any -value.'7 The court relied again upon the view that
opinions as to mental capacity could only be formed as the result of
personal contact and observation, constituting "personal transactions" with the plaintiff. Johnson v. Be&'8 is an analogous case.
The court stated that an opinion as to the genuineness of the
handwriting of a deceased person, formed by seeing the deceased
person in the act. of writing, or by means of any other personal
transaction, is incompetent. But, if such opinion is formed in other
ways, it is competent. Presumably, then, if the interested party
were, for example, a bank teller whose familiarity with the
decedent's signature was formed as the result of examining checks
or other instruments, he could testify. It is difficult to perceive
why this perhaps less reliable opinion should be favored, since
the temptation to falsification is present in both cases, and (if
a legitimate basis for the rule) should be determined by that
temptation rather than by reference to the nature of the witness'
experiences occuring while temptation was absent. However, the
same distinction was made in a later case and seems well
established. 9 . It is also settled that if, in an action upon a promissory note against the executrix of the deceased maker, the defendant pleads forgery the plaintiff is incompetent to testify how
the note came into his possession; or that the signature remained
the same up to the time of trial.20 In such a case it is, of course,
possible that the signature of the deceased person might be forged
even after his death. Presumably the court would hold this to be
a "personal transaction" !
Other cases turn upon the proof of a written instrument, or
its discharge. Harsh and unjust results are achieved. Thus, where
the plaintiff executed a bond payable to the defendant's testator,
and secured by a deed of trust which did not specifically mention
'7

Trowbridge v. Stone's Adm'r, 42 W. Va. 454, 26 S. E. 363 (1896).

18 Johnson v. Bee, 84 W. Va. 532, 100 S. E. 486 (1919).
'9

Poole v. Beller, 104 W. Va. 547, 140 S. E. 534 (1927).

20 Hancock v. Snider, 101 W. Va. 535, 133 S. E. 131 (1926).
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the bond, but recited an indebtedness in general terms, plaintiff
was not permitted to testify that he had paid the bond, secured
delivery of it and subsequently lost or destroyed it. An injunction
2
to restrain sale under the deed of trust was denied. A similar
holding was later made where it was sought to establish the terms
23
of a lost agreement. 22 In Davidson, Adm'x v. Browning, plaintiff
sought to recover money due upon a contract of sale made by her
decedent with the defendant buyer. The defense was payment. The
defendant was permitted to introduce in evidence checks bearing
notations "for cattle" and "on a/c", payable to the decedent and
cashed by him, signed with the drawer's name, "The Browning
Mines, by J. S. Browning", and to testify that he (defendant)
24
paid his own debts with checks signed in that manner.
The statute has been held not to bar testimony in certain
25
types of cases. In Gilmer's Adm'r v. Baker's Adm'r, the witness
was not a party to the suit, but he and the deceased person had
been joint commissioners. The witness' testimony tended to absolve
himself from liability. In view of the fact that the witness could
not be bound by the decree and that his testimony could not later
be used in his own behalf, the court permitted him to testify as
to a personal transaction with the decedent. It is submitted that
this type of case demonstrates the correct principle: - that "interest" in the outcome of the suit, whether it be that of a party
or'of a witness, presents equally the temptation. Would it not be
preferable to permit all persons to testify, whether parties or not,
letting such interest affect the credibility, rather than the competency of the testimony? Under the exception contained in the
statute, if a personal representative himself offers evidence of the
transaction, the defendant may then give his version, confined to
rebuttal, denial or explanation of plaintiff's own testimony. This
was applied in a creditor's suit in which the administratrix of one
X sought to establish a claim based upon a note executed by the
defendant to the testator. The plaintiff introduced a written agreement signed by the defendant and X, reciting various items consolidated into the note. The defendant was then permitted to testify "as an explanation of the circumstances surrounding the
ColweU v. Prindle's Adm'r, 11 W. Va. 307 (1877).
Robinson v. James, 29 W. Va. 224, 11 S. E. 920 (1886); of. Paxton v.
Paxton, 38 W. Va, 616, 18 S. E. 765 (1893). 276, 80 S.E. 363 (1913).
23 Davidson, Adm'x v. Browning, 73 W. Va.
512 (1892) ; Patter24 See also Swayne v. Riddle, 37 W. Va. 291, 16 S.E.
(1890).
517
E.
S.
10
494,
Va.
W.
33
Martin,
v.
son
2524 W. Va. 72 (1883).
21

22
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making of the contract.'"'2 Conversations or other personal transactions had with a deceased agent of a living party are not within
the statute.2 7 It is submitted that the policy thereof is not subserved
by such decisions. The principal is just as clearly at a disadvantage
in combating such testimony as is the personal representative of a
deceased person. Why should estates be entitled to greater protection against looting than that' accorded to the assets of living
persons?
It now remains to consider the application of these principles
to the settlement of estates of decedents. It is clearly within the
possibility of existing provisions of the Code that every estate can
be subjected to administration, whether indebted or not, solvent or
insolvent.2 8 If no suit is brought, claims can be established before
a commissioner only if itemized, accompanied by proper vouchers
and verified by affidavit. Allowable claims are limited to those
evidenced by books of account, note, bond, bill, writing obligatory,
judgment, decree, or other evidence of debt.2 9 If such instrument
be lost, the claim may be established by "proof of the same."
Nothing is stated as to what evidence is admissible for such
purposes, or whether it was intended to change the rule of Colwell
v. Pridle'sAdm'r. 30 If the claim is contested by counter-affidavit,
the "commissioner shall fix a time and place for hearing evidence
for and against such claim", but again nothing is said as to the
nature of admissible evidence. 1 Off-sets are to be allowed against
any claim.3 2 Presumably this does not include recoupment. Suppose
the defense is failure of consideration, fraud in the procurement,
or forgery of the instrument upon which the claim is based: may
the claimant testify that he gave value, did not perpetrate a fraud,
or commit a forgery? The statute is silent. Yet, if the commissioner
does admit such evidence what remedies are available for the correction of the error, if any? Exceptions may be filed to the report
before the county court, which may recommit to the commissioner
for the taking of new evidence. However, the appeal to the circuit
court is "on the record made before the commissioner and the
20

Janes v. Felton, 99 W. Va. 407, 411, 129 S. E. 482 (1925).

27 RHains v. Parkersburg, etc., Ry.Co., 75 W. Va. 613, 84 S.E. 923 (1915);

Board of Education v. Harvey, 70 W. Va. 480, .714 S. E. 507 (1912); Voss v.
King, 33 W. Va. 236, 10 S.E. 402 (1889).
REv. CODE (1931)
29 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931)

28W . VA.

c. 44, art. 1,
c. 44, art. 2,

30Supra n. 21.
31W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 44, art. 2,
32 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 44, art. 2,

§
§

11.
5.

§ 6.
§ 10.
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county court". 3 And, no right of appeal is given to the Supreme
Court."4 Further, the commissioner may not allow any claim
"barred by any statute of limitations. " 5 Again, nothing is said as
to the effect of a new promise in writing signed by the decedent
or his agent, or of an acknowledgment in writing from which a
promise may be implied.38
Clearly then, the creditor who has some written obligation
for the payment of money has an advantage over one whose claim
is oral and for the payment of money, or oral or written calling
for some other performance. This conclusion is not based upon
the requirement of a counter-affidavit. There is reason to believe
that it is largely a formality. Nor upon the "right" to a trial by
jury, or conversely the "dangers" of the same (depending upon
one's point of view). .It is believed, however, that the creditor
possessing a written obligation for the payment of money should
have this advantage. Mere possession is in itself evidence of value
given (performance) by the holder. In other cases, proof of performance must be independently established.
An action of
One other statutory provision is of interest.3
a personal
against
by
or
be
maintained
may
case
trespass on the
goods, or
any
of
away
carrying
or
representative for the taking
for the waste or destruction of, or damage to, any estate of or by
his decedent. While no cases have been found directly deciding
thd point, it would seem that the decedent might commit great
waste or damage to his neighbor's premises, in the presence of the
latter, who would be without a remedy unless he had other witnesses, or was able to secure a trial before the death of the trespasser. In view of the unreasonable and unjust results disclosed
3
by the foregoing case study, it is submitted that the statute
should be modified, and to that end, the following revision is
suggested:
Section 1. No person offered as a witness in any civil action,
suit, motion or proceeding (all hereinafter designated "proceeding"), in a court of law or equity, or before any commissioner,
shall be excluded by reason of the fact that he is a party, whether
33W . VA. R v. CODE (1931) c. 44, art. 2, §§ 18 and 19.
34 W. VA. CoNsT. art. 8, § 3. Query: does proof of claim, if disallowed, bar
creditor from action at law? Of. W. VA. REv. CoDii (1931) c. 44, art. 2, § 26.
- W. VA. REv.
3W. VA. Rav.
87W. VA. REV.
38 W. VA. REV.

CoDE
CODE
CODE
CoDE

(1931) c. 44, art. 2, § 12.
(1931) c. 55, art. 2, § 8.
(1931) c. 44, art. 1, § 23.
(1931) c. 57, art. 3, § 1.
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necessary or formal, thereto, except as stated in Sections 2 to 9
hereof.
Section 2. A party to any proceeding mentioned in Section
1 of this Article who is the executor, administrator, heir at law,
next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee or survivor of one who at
the time of the trial or hearing is dead, or the committee of one
who at the time of the trial or hearing is an insane person, shall
be designated as the "opposite party".
Section 3. One or niore living parties to any proceeding
mentioned in Section 1 of this Article, and opposed in interest
therein to such opposite party, shall be designated as the "living
party".
Section 4. No living party, whether plaintiff or defendant,
shall testify against the opposite party as to the formation, existence, performance or discharge of any:
(1) Oral trust, agreement, or contract express or implied, in
fact or in law, to which such person then deceased or insane is a
party; or
(2) Express trust, agreement or contract in writing of any
character to which such person then deceased or insane is a party,
not signedA by such person or by his agent; or
(3) Express trust, agreement or contract in writing other
than for the payment of money, signed by such person then
deceased or insane, or by his agent;
Except that in the cases specified in sub-section (3) hereof,
such living party may testify in support and corroboration of the
testimony of one or more witnesses offered on his behalf and not a
party to the proceeding, or if an opposite party, who testifies
against his own interest.
Section 5. No living party, whether plaintiff or defendant,
may testify against the opposite party as to the formation, existence, performance or discharge of any contract in writing calling
for the payment of money and signed by such person then deceased
or insane, or by his agent, except upon the following conditions:
(1) If such written contract be not lost or destroyed, it shall
be produced in such proceedings.
(2) If such written contract be lost, destroyed or so mutilated that its terms cannot be read, then its production shall be
excused if its terms be first established by the testimony of one
or more witnesses not a party to the proceeding, or if an opposite
party, who testifies against his own interest.
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Book accounts, ledgers and other books of regular entry, made
up in the usual course of business and at or about the time of
the transaction evidenced thereby, shall be considered as a contract
in writing within the meaning of this section, although not signed
by such person then deceased or insane, or by his agent.
Section 6. No living party, whether plaintiff or defendant,
shall testify against the opposite party as to any of the following
acts or omissions by such person then deceased or insane:
(1) Forgery of any writing;
(2) Fraud, duress or undue influence;
(3) Failure of consideration;
(4) Any other act or omission which, but for the death or
insanity, would have been available to such living party
by testimony in his own behalf, as an equitable defense
or as a ground for equitable relief, within the provisions
of Section 5, Article 5, Chapter 56 of this Code.
Section 7. No living party who is a physician against whom
action is instituted under the provisions of Article 7, Chapter 55,
of this Code, for causing the death of the decedent, by wrongful
act, neglect or default shall testify against the opposite party as
to any conversation had with such decedent.
Section 8. If any opposite party, or any witness offered on
his behalf shall testify as to any matter as to which the living
party is incompetent to testify as specified in Sections 4, 5, 6 and
7, at any stage of the proceedings, then the living party may
testify in his own behalf as to such matter. The living party shall,
however, be restricted to testimony in rebuttal or contradiction of
the testimony offered by or on behalf of the opposite party.
Section 9. If otherwise competent to testify, the husband
or wife of a living party shall be permitted to testify in his or her
behalf, as the case may be.
The difficulty encountered in drafting a satisfactory statute
is that one must attempt to anticipate its application to the entire
body of the law. It is obviously impossible to imagine every conceivable situation which may call for its application. It is believed,
however, that the statute should proceed upon the principle that the
living party should be permitted to testify except in cases where
(a) the temptation to falsify is great, and (b) it is unlikely that
the opposite party will be able to secure evidence in contradiction
thereof. It would seem, therefore, that testimony as to oral trusts,
agreements or contracts should be excluded. The same principle
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should apply to purported writings which are not signed by the
decedent or by his agent. If, however, such instrument is signed,
there is a strong probability that it should be enforced, with the
additional safeguard that the testimony of the living party be
supported and corroborated by that of a disinterested witness. But
this restriction is applied only to obligations not for the payment
of money. It also believed that a distinction should be made in the
case of notes and other obligations calling for the payment of
money. The living party should be required to produce the instrument or explain its non-production and introdude by a disinterested
witness satisfactory proof of its terms. If this is done, there is
little likelihood that the estate will be victimized by false testimony
of the living holder of the obligation, even though uncorroborated
by any other witness. Mere possession of such an instrument indicates that thee holder (a) gave value and (b) that the decedent
has not paid or discharged it. In the case of disputed documents,
testimony as to the genuineness of the deceased person's signature
is usually available to both parties to the litigation. Consequently
there would seem to be slight danger in permitting the living
party to testify. The same observation applies to proof of mental
incapacity of the deceased person to make a will or other instrument.
With reference to proof of forgery, fraud, duress, undue influence, failure of consideration, or other equitable grounds for
relief or defense, it is submitted that the living party should not
be permitted to testify that he was the victim of any such wrong
or omission which is the result of the act of the deceased party.
Upon the other hand, if the opposite parties charge that the living
party was guilty of any! such act or omission, there would seem
to.be slight danger in permitting the latter to deny this charge by
his own testimony. The reason for the distinction lies in the probability of being able to secure evidence. In the latter case, those
opposed to the living party will necessarily be upon the affirmative
side of the issue and consequently will have evidence to support
it; otherwise they would have no reason to raise the point. In the
former case, the living party could take the affirmative and there
is no assurance that the opposite party would have any evidence
with which to make a successful defense.
The statute as proposed abolishes the archaic unity of husband
and wife which was the basis for the rule excluding each in behalf
of the other. The provision of the present statute is retained, as
applied to the testimony of physicians who are defendants in
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actions for wrongful death. With this exception, there is no lilitation placed upon either the nature or extent of the living party's
testimony in such actions.
The phrase "personal transaction" is eliminated for obvious
reasons. In a word, the proposed statute purports to place the
living party upon the same plane of competency as in other cases
where all parties are alive and sane, except in the instances
enumerated.
It is further believed that the provisions for waiver should
be somewhat liberalized. It is to be supposed that the object of
the proceeding is to discover the truth and to guard against falsification. The mere fact that one of the interested parties testifies
in his own behalf affords no assurance that the living party will
testify truthfully. Yet the present statute apparently proceeds
upon such a theory. Therefore, it would seem that the living party
should be permitted to testify at least in denial or rebuttal of the
testimony of any witness offered by the opposite party. The proposed statute so provides.
It is hoped that the suggestions here made will at least serve
as a basis for discussion to the end that proper revision of the
existing statute may be made.
ROBERT T. DoNLEY.
MORRIS S. PUNT.
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